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Summary
Background The number of infections caused by resistant organisms is largely unknown. We estimated the number 
of infections worldwide that are caused by the WHO priority pathogens third-generation cephalosporin-resistant and 
carbapenem-resistant Escherichia coli and Klebsiella pneumoniae.
Methods We calculated a uniform weighted mean incidence of serious infections caused by antibiotic-susceptible 
E coli and K pneumoniae using data from 17 countries. Using this uniform incidence, as well as population sizes and 
country-specific resistance levels, we estimated the number of infections caused by third-generation cephalosporin-
resistant and carbapenem-resistant E coli and K pneumoniae in 193 countries in 2014. We also calculated interval 
estimates derived from changing the fixed incidence of susceptible infections to 1 SD below and above the weighted 
mean. We compared an additive model with combination models in which resistant infections were replaced by 
susceptible infections. We distinguished between higher-certainty regions (those with good-quality data sources for 
resistance levels and resistance ≤30%), moderate-certainty regions (those with good-quality data sources for 
resistance levels and including some countries with resistance >30%), and low-certainty regions (those in which 
good-quality data sources for resistance levels were unavailable for countries comprising at least 20% of the region’s 
population, regardless of resistance level).
Findings Using the additive model, we estimated that third-generation cephalosporin-resistant E coli and K pneumoniae 
caused 6·4 million (interval estimate 3·5–9·2) bloodstream infections and 50·1 million (27·5–72·8) serious infections 
in 2014; estimates were 5·5 million (3·0–7·9) bloodstream infections and 43·1 million (23·6–62·2) serious infections 
in the 25% replacement model, 4·6 million (2·5–6·6) bloodstream infections and 36·0 million (19·7–52·2) serious 
infections in the 50% replacement model, and 3·7 million (2·0–5·3) bloodstream infections and 28·9 million 
(15·8–41·9) serious infections in the 75% replacement model. Carbapenem-resistant strains caused 0·5 million 
(0·3–0·7) bloodstream infections and 3·1 million (1·8–4·5) serious infections based on the additive model, 
0·5 million (0·3–0·7) bloodstream infections and 3·0 million (1·7–4·3) serious infections based on the 25% 
replacement model, 0·4 million (0·2–0·6) bloodstream infections and 2·8 million (1·6–4·1) serious infections based 
on the 50% replacement model, and 0·4 million (0·2–0·6) bloodstream infections and 2·7 million (1·5–3·8) serious 
infections based on the 75% replacement model.
Interpretation To our knowledge, this study is the first to report estimates of the global number of infections caused 
by antibiotic-resistant priority pathogens. Uncertainty stems from scant data on resistance levels from low-income 
and middle-income countries and insufficient knowledge regarding resistance dynamics when resistance is high.
Funding Innovative Medicines Initiative.
Copyright © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 
4.0 license.
Introduction
Antimicrobial resistance has been recognised as a 
global public health crisis by organisations such as the 
UN and WHO.1,2 WHO’s Global Action Plan on 
Antimicrobial Resistance calls for research to fill the 
knowledge gaps regarding the incidence of infections 
caused by anti microbial-resistant pathogens.2 Data on 
the number and incidence of infections caused by these 
organisms are scarce. Multicountry antimicrobial 
resistance surveillance systems, such as the European 
Anti microbial Resistance Surveillance Network (EARS-
Net)3 and the Central Asian and Eastern European 
Surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance (CAESAR),4 
track the proportion of isolates within a given species 
that are resistant to an antibiotic, and not the number of 
infections caused by antimicrobial-resistant organisms, 
which are much harder data to collect. Likewise, in 
its 2014 global report on surveillance of antimicrobial 
resistance, WHO presented country-level data only on 
the proportion of resistant isolates.5 This proportion is 
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important to clinicians choosing empirical therapy but 
does not provide the necessary information for policy 
makers and antibiotic developers to act on the number 
and incidence of infections (ie, market size and, when 
combined with associated morbidity and mortality, the 
burden of disease).6
Third-generation cephalosporin-resistant and carba- 
penem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae appear in the highest 
category on WHO’s list of priority pathogens for research 
and development of new antibiotics.7 The US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) classify third-
generation cephalosporin-resistant Entero- bacteriaceae 
as a serious threat and carbapenem-resistant Entero-
bacteriaceae as an urgent threat.8 We aimed to estimate 
the annual number and incidence per million  population 
of infections caused by third-generation cephalosporin-
resistant and carbapenem-resistant Escherichia coli and 
Klebsiella pneumoniae worldwide.
Methods
Study overview
We followed the Guidelines for Accurate and Transparent 
Health Estimates Reporting.9 A list of the guidelines’ 
elements and where they can be found in this manuscript 
is in appendix 1. A detailed description of our methods is 
also presented in appendix 1.
We hypothesised that the incidence per 1000 population 
of serious infections caused by third-generation cephalo- 
sporin-susceptible or carbapenem-susceptible E coli and 
K pneumoniae is similar across countries. This hypothesis 
is biologically plausible because most infections caused 
by antibiotic-susceptible Enterobacteriaceae result from 
translocation of indigenous gut flora to extraintestinal 
sites;10 we would not expect such events to vary greatly 
by country. We tested our hypothesis using country-
level data. We then used this uniform incidence of 
susceptible infections, as well as population sizes and 
Research in context
Evidence before this study
We searched PubMed between Jan 1, 2000, and May 31, 2017, to 
identify studies that estimated the number of infections caused 
by antimicrobial-resistant organisms in a country, a region, 
or worldwide. A search using the terms (“antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria” OR “multidrug-resistant bacteria” OR 
“multidrug-resistant organisms”) AND (“estimates” OR 
“estimating”) yielded three relevant studies. These studies 
estimated the number of bloodstream infections caused by 
third-generation cephalosporin-resistant Escherichia coli and 
meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in 31 European 
countries in 2007, the number of inpatient infections caused by 
seven antimicrobial-resistant bacteria in France in 2012, or the 
number of health-care-associated resistant infections in Finland 
in 2010. We also knew of three relevant reports that are not 
indexed in PubMed. The first, by the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control, used data from the European 
Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network to estimate the 
number of infections caused by six resistant species in 
29 European countries in 2007. A 2013 report by the US Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention presented estimates of the 
annual number of hospital-acquired infections in the USA caused 
by antimicrobial-resistant organisms, which included 
26 000 infections caused by third-generation 
cephalosporin-resistant, and 9300 infections caused by 
carbapenem-resistant, E coli and Klebsiella pneumoniae. The 2014 
O’Neill Report commissioned by the UK Government estimated 
that 700 000 deaths per year worldwide are attributable to 
infections caused by six antimicrobial-resistant species, including 
E coli and K pneumoniae; estimating the number of infections was 
a step in the analysis, but those results were not published.
Added value of this study
To our knowledge, this study is the first to report worldwide, 
pathogen-specific estimates of the number of infections 
caused by antimicrobial-resistant organisms in 1 year (2014). 
We estimated the number of infections caused by 
third-generation cephalosporin-resistant and 
carbapenem-resistant E coli and K pneumoniae in 
193 countries. We presented methods to convert the 
proportion of resistance (a value that is often known through 
laboratory-based surveillance) into the number of resistant 
infections (data that are difficult to obtain and collected 
infrequently). When possible, our calculations were based on 
country-specific data on the level of resistance, and we graded 
the quality of these data. Because of the lack of empirical 
evidence describing resistance dynamics when the level of 
resistance is high, we compared the results of four models: 
an additive model in which resistant infections supplement 
antibiotic-susceptible infections, and 25%, 50%, and 
75% replacement models in which resistant infections 
supplant susceptible infections once resistance rises above 
30%. We validated our results for eight countries or states 
that collect incidence data based on mandatory reporting of 
resistant infections.
Implications of all the available evidence
According to our estimates, the number of infections caused 
by antibiotic-resistant E coli and K pneumoniae in 2014 was 
high: 50·1  million serious third-generation cephalosporin-
resistant infections and 3·1 million serious carbapenem-
resistant infections by the additive model, decreasing to 36·0 
million and 2·8 million, respectively, in the 50% replacement 
model. Accurate global estimates depend on strengthening 
surveillance of antimicrobial resistance in low-income and 
middle-income countries. Laboratory-based antimicrobial 
resistance surveillance systems must incorporate 
epidemiological data to improve estimates of the incidence of 
resistant infections.
See Online for appendix 1
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country-specific resistance levels (ie, proportion of 
isolates resistant to a given antibiotic class), to calculate 
the number and incidence of infections caused by third-
generation cephalosporin-resistant and carbapenem-
resistant E coli and K pneumoniae.
Whether antimicrobial resistance follows an additive 
model, a replacement model, or a combination of both is 
uncertain. In an additive model, resistant infections 
occur in addition to susceptible infections, whereas in 
a replacement model, resistant infections supplant 
susceptible infections. Previous studies11–13 have provided 
evidence in support of the additive model but were 
limited to countries with resistance levels lower than 
30%; thus, it is possible that replacement occurs in 
settings with higher levels of resistance. We compared 
four models: a fully additive model and models of 25%, 
50%, and 75% replacement, beginning once resistance 
surpasses 30%. Figure 1 presents a conceptual overview 
of the analysis using the example of third-generation 
cephalosporin-resistant E coli.
We estimated the number and incidence of 
bloodstream infections and serious infections (which 
include bloodstream infections) caused by third-
generation cephalosporin-resistant and carbapenem-
resistant E coli and K pneumoniae. We defined serious 
infections as those that ideally should be treated in a 
hospital, while recognising that not all patients with 
infections live in an area with access to inpatient 
care. For third-generation cephalosporin-resistant E coli 
and K pneumoniae, we also estimated the number 
of outpatient infections; we assumed that all infections 
caused by carbapenem-resistant E coli and K pneum­
oniae, for which oral therapy is rarely available, are 
serious and would require inpatient treatment. 
Our estimates encompassed all patients, regardless of 
age and sex.
We produced country-level estimates for the 193 member 
states in the UN,14 which we grouped into 18 regions 
according to the UN’s classification system.15 The period 
for our estimates was 2014: whenever available, we used 
Figure 1: Conceptual overview of the data analysis method
3GC=third-generation cephalosporin. 
Inputs Outputs
For the 17 countries that met inclusion criteria:
Number of hospital beds covered by surveillance system and number of 
hospital beds in country or reported proportion of country’s hospital beds 
covered by surveillance
Number of Escherichia coli blood isolates submitted to surveillance system
Proportion of E coli blood isolates that are susceptible to 3GC
Proportion of all serious E coli infections that are bloodstream infections 
(constant value for all countries)
Country population size
Using data from 17 countries that met inclusion criteria, estimate the mean 
incidence of serious infections caused by 3GC-susceptible E coli (a constant rate 
to be applied to all countries); this rate remains fixed in the additive model and 
starts to fall in the replacement models once resistance is >30%
For all 193 countries: 
Mean incidence of serious infections caused by 3GC-susceptible E coli
Country population size
For 193 countries, estimate the number of serious infections caused by 
3GC-susceptible E coli using the additive model
Number of serious infections caused by 3GC-susceptible E coli
Proportion of E coli isolates that are resistant to 3GC
For each country, estimate the number of serious infections caused by 
3GC-resistant E coli using the additive model 
Mean incidence of serious 3GC-susceptible E coli infections
Incidence of serious total (susceptible plus resistant) E coli infections
Proportion of E coli isolates that are resistant to 3GC in the country
Calculate the incidence of serious total (susceptible plus resistant) infections 
when resistance is 31%; in a 100% replacement model this incidence remains 
fixed once resistance is >30%
Calculate the incidence of serious total infections in models of 25%, 50%, and 
75% replacement by weighting the average of the additive and 100% 
replacement models 
For countries with resistance >30%, estimate the number of serious 
3GC-resistant E coli infections using the 25%, 50%, and 75% replacement models
Number of serious 3GC-resistant E coli infections (by additive and replacement 
models)
Proportion of all serious E coli infections that are bloodstream infections 
(constant value for all countries)
For each country, estimate the number of 3GC-resistant E coli bloodstream 
infections
Number of serious 3GC-resistant E coli infections (by additive and replacement 
models)
Ratio of outpatient to serious 3GC-resistant E coli infections (constant value for 
all countries) 
For each country, estimate the number of outpatient 3GC-resistant E coli 
infections
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2014 data on levels of resistance and World Bank 
population estimates for 2014.16
Data inputs
Descriptions of the process for identifying and accessing 
all data inputs, of inclusion and exclusion criteria, and of 
the methods used to imput missing values are in 
appendix 1. The first data inputs were those required to 
estimate, for each of the four species–resistance pairs, 
the mean incidence of serious infections caused by 
susceptible organisms, to be applied to all countries. We 
identified countries with surveillance data, mainly from 
EARS-Net, that allowed estimation of the proportion of 
the country’s hospital beds covered by surveillance. We 
excluded countries in which surveillance covered less 
than 30% of the country’s hospital beds. EARS-Net is 
based on blood isolates, which was advantageous for the 
purpose of this study because such isolates represent 
serious infections rather than colonisation or outpatient 
infections. For each of the 17 countries that met inclusion 
criteria, we estimated the incidence of serious infections 
caused by third-generation cephalosporin-susceptible 
and carbapenem-susceptible E coli and K pneumoniae 
using five inputs: the number of isolates submitted to 
surveillance and the proportion that were susceptible, 
the proportion of the country covered by surveillance, the 
population size, and a constant value for the proportion 
of serious infections that are bloodstream infections 
(derived with data from our hospital).
The second major input was resistance levels in each 
country, which were gathered from various sources, 
including EARS-Net and CAESAR, national antimicrobial 
resistance surveillance systems, WHO’s global report on 
antimicrobial resistance surveillance,5 and scientific 
articles. For countries with no such data, we used the 
median for the region. The process for identifying 
sources is shown in appendix 1. We graded the quality of 
the sources using the scheme shown in the panel and 
then classified regions as higher certainty, moderate 
certainty, and low certainty. Higher-certainty regions had 
grade 1–2 data on level of resistance for countries 
comprising at least 80% of the region’s population, and 
no country within the region had resistance higher than 
30%; for these regions, the additive and replacement 
models were identical. We classified moderate-certainty 
regions as those in which grade 1–2 data on resistance 
levels were available for countries comprising at least 
80% of the region’s population and in which some 
countries had resistance higher than 30%. Low-certainty 
regions were those in which grade 1–2 data were 
unavailable for countries comprising at least 20% of the 
region’s population, regardless of resistance level.
Data analysis
We estimated the mean incidence of serious infections 
caused by third-generation cephalosporin-susceptible and 
carbapenem-susceptible E coli and K pneumoniae. We first 
estimated the annual number of antibiotic-susceptible 
bloodstream infections in each of the 17 countries by 
dividing the number of susceptible isolates reported to 
surveillance systems by the proportion of the country that 
was represented in surveillance. Next, we divided the 
number of susceptible bloodstream infections by the 
constant value for the proportion of serious infections 
that are bloodstream infections (0·12 for E coli and 
0·17 for K pneumoniae) to estimate the annual number of 
serious infections caused by susceptible strains. We 
expressed this value as incidence per 1000 population. We 
then calculated the weighted mean of the incidence of 
serious susceptible infections in the 17 countries to 
generate the value to be applied to all countries. Weighting 
was done according to the proportion of the country that 
was covered by surveillance. We displayed each country’s 
incidence and weighted mean incidence in funnel plots 
to see if values clustered around the mean, which would 
support our primary hypothesis that the incidence of 
serious susceptible infections is similar in all countries. 
We displayed upper and lower control limits that were 
one or two SEs from the mean. For all subsequent 
calculations, we used one SD below and above the 
weighted mean incidence as our interval estimate (ie, we 
Panel: Classification scheme to grade data sources for 
countries’ levels of resistance
Grade 1 
Multicountry surveillance systems (eg, European 
Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network, Central Asian 
and Eastern European Surveillance of Antimicrobial 
Resistance, Pan-American Health Organization antimicrobial 
resistance report) or national surveillance systems
Grade 2 
National data obtained for the 2014 WHO antimicrobial 
resistance report or privately sponsored multicountry 
surveillance systems (eg, Tigecycline Evaluation and 
Surveillance Trial) with more than three sites in the country, 
or data from the Center for Disease Dynamics, Economics and 
Policy if more than three sites
Grade 3 
Published articles with data collected from more than three 
sites in the country
Grade 4
Published articles with data collected from three sites or fewer 
in the country or privately sponsored multicountry 
surveillance systems with three sites or fewer in the country
Grade 5
Any data source with sample size of less than 100 isolates or 
sample size not reported, or all data collected before 2011
Grade 6 
No data available, value imputed
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set a middle, low, and high value for the incidence of 
serious susceptible infections).
The major steps to calculate the number of infections 
caused by resistant strains were as follows. First, for the 
additive model, we calculated the number of serious 
resistant infections in each country using the fixed 
incidence of serious susceptible infections, the popu-
lation size, and the country-specific resistance level. 
Second, we modelled 100% replacement, in which every 
resistant infection replaces a susceptible infection once 
resistance is above 30%. At that point, the incidence of all 
serious infections (resistant plus susceptible) remains 
fixed at a value set slightly above that reached by the 
additive model at 30% resistance. To calculate the 
incidence of all serious infections for the 25%, 50%, and 
75% replacement models, we weighted the average of the 
additive and 100% replacement models accordingly. 
Using the incidence of all serious infections, the 
population size, and the country-specific resistance level, 
we calculated the number of serious resistant infections 
for each country. To calculate the number of bloodstream 
infections caused by resistant strains, we multiplied the 
number of serious resistant infections by the constant 
value for the proportion of serious infections that are 
bloodstream infections. To calculate the number of 
outpatient infections, we used a constant ratio of 
outpatient to serious infections derived from Swiss 
surveillance data (4·0 for third-generation cephalosporin-
resistant and 2·1 for carbapenem-resistant infections).17
For all indicators, interval estimates were based on 
changing only the incidence of serious susceptible 
infections. We did not vary three other important 
parameters: the proportion of isolates that were resistant 
in each country, the proportion of serious infections that 
were bloodstream infections, or the ratio of outpatient to 
serious infections.
Role of the funding source
The funder had no role in study design, data collection, 
data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of the 
manuscript. The corresponding author had full access 
to all of the data in the study and the final responsibility 
for the decision to submit for publication.
Results
The annual incidence of serious infections caused by third-
generation cephalosporin-susceptible and carbapenem-
susceptible E coli and K pneumoniae in the 17 countries that 
met inclusion criteria are shown in figure 2 and appendix 2. 
For all four species–resistance pairs, most countries fell 
Figure 2: Annual incidence of serious infections caused by antibiotic-susceptible Escherichia coli and Klebsiella pneumoniae in 17 countries
Black solid lines are the weighted means; green lines are 1 SE and blue lines are 2 SEs from the weighted means. (A) Third-generation cephalosporin-susceptible E coli. 
(B) Carbapenem-susceptible E coli. (C) Third-generation cephalosporin-susceptible K pneumoniae. (D) Carbapenem-susceptible K pneumoniae.
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within 1 SE of the weighted mean and all fell within 2 SEs 
of the weighted mean, except for Malta and Israel where 
the annual incidence of infections caused by carbapenem-
susceptible K pneumoniae was more than 2 SEs higher 
than the weighted mean. The plots confirmed our 
hypothesis of a similar incidence of serious susceptible 
infections in these countries, allowing use of the weighted 
mean incidence in subsequent calculations.
Our grading of sources reporting levels of resistance 
in individual countries is presented, by region, in 
appendix 1. Grade 1–2 data were available for about half 
of the world’s population, and were rare or absent for 
countries in the Caribbean, all regions of Asia except for 
east Asia, and all regions of Africa except for southern 
Africa.
The effect of the additive, replacement, and 
combination models on the estimated incidence of 
resistant infections are presented in table 1 and figure 3, 
using third-generation cephalosporin-resistant E coli as 
an example. As resistance levels increase, differences 
between the models in estimates of the number of 
resistant infections become more pronounced. When 
resistance is 40%, estimates from the additive model are 
12% higher than those from the 75% replacement model; 
when resistance reaches 77%, estimates from the additive 
model are twice those from the 75% replacement model. 
Thus, uncertainty in estimating the number of resistant 
infections is much greater in countries with very high 
resistance.
Table 2 presents estimates of the number of bloodstream 
and serious infections from the additive and combination 
models, by region for carbapenem-resistant K pneumoniae 
and by certainty level for third-generation cephalosporin-
resistant E coli and K pneumoniae and carbapenem-
resistant E coli. Estimates by region for third-generation 
cephalosporin-resistant E coli and K pneumoniae and 
carbapenem-resistant E coli are presented in appendix 1. 
Estimates by country for cephalosporin-resistant E coli 
and K pneumoniae and carbapenem-resistant E coli and 
K pneumoniae are presented in appendix 2.
 For carbapenem-resistant K pneumoniae (for which 
few countries had resistance >30%), the worldwide point 
estimate of serious infections was 2·1 million (interval 
estimate 1·1–3·0) with the additive model versus 1·6 
million (0·9–2·3) with the 75% replacement model 
(table 2); the difference was driven by high levels of 
resistance in India. For third-generation cephalosporin-
resistant E coli (for which high resistance was more 
common), the difference between models was wider 
than for carbapenem-resistant K pneumoniae: from 43·1 
million (23·5–62·7) in the additive model to 24·9 million 
(13·5–36·2) in the 75% replacement model. Country-
level estimates of outpatient infections are shown in 
appendix 3.
We identified six countries and two US states with 
mandatory reporting systems for third-generation 
cephalosporin-resistant or carbapenem-resistant Entero- 
bacteriaceae (table 3). Those systems differ from 
laboratory-based systems such as EARS-Net in that they 
count all cases (defined by different systems as 
bloodstream infections only, inpatient infections only, or 
all infections) throughout the country (or US state), and 
not only the proportion of resistant isolates in a sample. 
We compared our estimates with the observed number 
of infections in 2014 (table 3). In 21 of 32 instances, 
the observed value definitely or probably fell within 
our estimated range and, in six other instances, we 
underestimated or overestimated by fewer than 30 cases 
per year. Only one datapoint involved a resistance level of 
greater than 30% (third-generation cephalosporin-
resistant K pneumoniae in Israel, with 54% resistance). 
The observed number of bloodstream infections caused 
Additive model 100% replacement model
Incidence of 
susceptible 
infections
Incidence of 
resistant 
infections
Incidence of 
all 
infections
Incidence of 
susceptible 
infections
Incidence of 
resistant 
infections
Incidence of 
all 
infections
10% 4·26 0·47 4·73 4·26 0·47 4·73
20% 4·26 1·07 5·33 4·26 1·07 5·33
30% 4·26 1·83 6·09 4·26 1·83 6·09
40% 4·26 2·84 7·10 3·67 2·45 6·12
50% 4·26 4·26 8·52 3·06 3·06 6·12
60% 4·26 6·39 10·65 2·45 3·67 6·12
Data are incidence per 1000 population. In the additive model, the incidence of serious susceptible infections remains 
fixed and resistant infections occur in addition to susceptible infections. In the 100% replacement model, once the 
level of resistance is greater than 30%, the incidence of total serious infections remains fixed as resistant infections 
replace susceptible infections. The incidence of resistant infections is higher in the additive model than in the 100% 
replacement model after 30% resistance, and the gap widens as resistance rises.
Table 1: Comparison of the additive and 100% replacement models by percentage of Escherichia coli 
isolates that are resistant to third-generation cephalosporins
Figure 3: Estimated incidence of serious infections caused by third-generation cephalosporin-resistant 
Escherichia coli with the various models
In the combination models, replacement begins once the level of resistance is greater than 30%. 
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 Bloodstream infections (in thousands) Serious infections (in thousands)
 Additive 25% replacement 50% replacement 75% replacement Additive 25% replacement 50% replacement 75% replacement
Carbapenem-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae*
World total 351 (195–506) 324 (180–468) 297 (165–430) 270 (150–392) 2062 (1146–2978) 1905 (1058–2753) 1747 (971–2529) 1590 (884–2305)
Higher certainty 24 (13–34) 24 (13–34) 24 (13–34) 24 (13–34) 138 (77–200) 138 (77–200) 138 (77–200) 138 (77–200) 
Western Europe 0·3 (0·2–0·4) 0·3 (0·2–0·4) 0·3 (0·2–0·4) 0·3 (0·2–0·4) 2 (1–2) 2 (1–2) 2 (1–2) 2 (1–2)
Northern 
Europe
0·1 (0·1–0·2) 0·1 (0·1–0·2) 0·1 (0·1–0·2) 0·1 (0·1–0·2) 0·8 (0·5–1·2) 0·8 (0·5–1·2) 0·8 (0·5–1·2) 0·8 (0·5–1·2)
Northern 
America
4 (2–6) 4 (2–6) 4 (2–6) 4 (2–6) 25 (14–36) 25 (14–36) 25 (14–36) 25 (14–36)
Central America 2 (1–3) 2 (1–3) 2 (1–3) 2 (1–3) 14 (8–20) 14 (8–20) 14 (8–20) 14 (8–20)
Southern Africa 0·3 (0·2–0·5) 0·3 (0·2–0·5) 0·3 (0·2–0·5) 0·3 (0·2–0·5) 2 (1–3) 2 (1–3) 2 (1–3) 2 (1–3)
Eastern Asia 16 (9–23) 16 (9–23) 16 (9–23) 16 (9–23) 95 (53–138) 95 (53–138) 95 (53–138) 95 (53–138)
Moderate 
certainty 
38 (21–55) 37 (21–54) 36 (20–52) 34 (19–50) 226 (125–326) 218 (121–315) 210 (117–304) 202 (112–293) 
Southern 
Europe
9 (5–13) 9 (5–13) 8 (5–12) 8 (4–11) 54 (30–78) 51 (28–74) 48 (27–70) 45 (25–66)
Eastern Europe 8 (4–11) 7 (4–11) 7 (4–10) 6 (4–9) 45 (25–66) 43 (24–62) 41 (23–59) 38 (21–55)
South America 22 (12–31) 21 (12–30) 21 (11–30) 20 (11–29) 127 (70–183) 124 (69–179) 121 (67–175) 118 (66–172)
Low certainty 289 (160–417) 263 (146–381) 238 (132–344) 212 (118–308) 1698 (944–2452) 1549 (861–2239) 1399 (778–2025) 1250 (695–1812)
Southeastern 
Asia
6 (3–8) 6 (3–8) 6 (3–8) 6 (3–8) 33 (19–48) 33 (19–48) 33 (19–48) 33 (19–48)
South-central 
Asia
266 (148–385) 241 (134–348) 216 (120–312) 190 (106–276) 1567 (871–2263) 1418 (788–2050) 1269 (705–1837) 1120 (623–1624)
Western Asia 3 (2–4) 3 (2–4) 3 (2–4) 3 (2–4) 17 (10–25) 17 (10–25) 17 (10–25) 17 (10–25)
Eastern Africa 3 (2–4) 3 (2–4) 3 (2–4) 3 (2–4) 17 (10–25) 17 (10–25) 17 (10–25) 17 (10–25)
Middle Africa 0·4 (0·2–0·5) 0·4 (0·2–0·5) 0·4 (0·2–0·5) 0·4 (0·2–0·5) 2 (1–3) 2 (1–3) 2 (1–3) 2 (1–3)
Northern Africa 8 (4–11) 8 (4–11) 8 (4–11) 8 (4–11) 45 (25–66) 45 (25–66) 45 (25–66) 44 (25–64)
Western Africa 2 (1–4) 2 (1–4) 2 (1–4) 2 (1–4) 15 (8–21) 15 (8–21) 15 (8–21) 15 (8–21)
Caribbean 0·05 
(0·03–0·8)
0·05 
(0·03–0·8)
0·05 
(0·03–0·8)
0·05 
(0·03–0·8)
0·3 
(0·2–0·5)
0·3 
(0·2–0·5)
0·3 
(0·2–0·5)
0·3 
(0·2–0·5)
Oceania 0·05 
(0·03–0·7)
0·05 
(0·03–0·7)
0·05 
(0·03–0·7)
0·05 
(0·03–0·7)
0·3 
(0·2–0·4)
0·3 
(0·2–0·4)
0·3 
(0·2–0·4)
0·3 
(0·2–0·4)
Third-generation cephalosporin-resistant Escherichia coli
World total 5173 
(2817–7529)
4447 
(2423–6476)
3718 
(2024–5410)
2986 
(1626–4345)
43 107 
(23 476–62 737)
37 060 
(20 194–53 966)
30 985 
(16 871–45 087)
24 887 
(13 548–36 207)
Higher certainty 56 (31–82) 56 (31–82) 56 (31–82) 56 (31–82) 469 (255–682) 469 (255–682) 469 (255–682) 469 (255–682)
Moderate 
certainty 
1220 
(664–1776)
1124 
(613–1639)
1025 
(558–1491)
923 (503–1343) 10 167 
(5537–14 797)
9364 
(5112–13 661)
8542 
(4650–12 428)
7696 
(4189–11 195)
Low certainty 3896 
(2122–5671)
3267 
(1779–4755)
2637  
(1436–3837)
2007 
(1092–2920)
31 784 
(17 309–46 258)
27 227 
(14 826–39 623)
21 975 
(11 965–31 976)
16 723 
(9104–24 329)
Third-generation cephalosporin-resistant K pneumoniae
World total 1197 
(684–1710)
1024 
(585–1462)
851 
(486–1214)
677 
(387–966)
7042  
(4024–10 061)
6023 
(3442–8601)
5003 
(2859–7141)
3985 
(2277–5680)
Higher certainty 8 (5–12) 8 (5–12) 8 (5–12) 8 (5–12) 48 (28–69) 48 (28–69) 48 (28–69) 48 (28–69)
Moderate 
certainty
291 (166–415) 260 (148–371) 227 (130–325) 196 (112–279) 1709 (977–2442) 1527 (872–2180) 1338 (765–1910) 1151 (658–1640)
Low certainty 898 (513–1283) 756 (432–1080) 615 (351–878) 474 (271–675) 5285 (3020–7550) 4448 (2542–6353) 3617 (2067–5162) 2785 (1591–3971)
Carbapenem-resistant E coli
World total 130 (76–184) 130 (76–184) 130 (76–184) 130 (76–184) 1084 (634–1533) 1084 (634–1533) 1084 (634–1533) 1084 (634–1533)
Higher certainty 13 (7–18) 13 (7–18) 13 (7–18) 13 (7–18) 106 (62–150) 106 (62–150) 106 (62–150) 106 (62–150)
Low certainty 117 (69–166) 117 (69–166) 117 (69–166) 117 (69–166) 978 (572–1383) 978 (572–1383) 978 (572–1383) 978 (572–1383)
Data in parentheses are interval estimates derived from changing the fixed incidence of susceptible infections to 1 SD below and above the weighted mean. Estimates were the same for all models when 
resistance was ≤30%. *Data are also shown by UN region.
Table 2: Estimates of resistant bloodstream infections and serious infections in 2014, by model, WHO priority pathogen, and certainty level
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Observed values, 2014 Estimated values, 2014 (additive model) Summary
Data type Infections Data type Estimate*
Ireland3,18
3GC-resistant Escherichia coli Invasive isolates (blood or CSF) 357 Bloodstream infections 313 (170–455) In range
3GC-resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae Invasive isolates (blood or CSF) 46 Bloodstream infections 74 (42–106) In range
Carbapenem-resistant K pneumoniae Invasive isolates (blood or CSF) 4 Bloodstream infections 4 (2–6) In range
Finland19
3GC-resistant E coli Bloodstream infections 232 Bloodstream infections 156 (85–227) Underestimate
3GC-resistant K pneumoniae Bloodstream infections 20 Bloodstream infections 19 (11–28) In range
3GC-resistant E coli All infection types; inpatients and outpatients; includes 
unknown percentage of screening cultures†
4190 All infection types; 
inpatients and outpatients
6511 (3546–9475) Probably in range
3GC-resistant K pneumoniae All infection types; inpatients and outpatients; includes 
unknown percentage of screening cultures†
312 All infection types; 
inpatients and outpatients
353 (201–504) Probably in range
Denmark3,20
3GC-resistant E coli Bloodstream infections (first infection per patient per year) 314 Bloodstream infections 244 (133–355) In range
3GC-resistant K pneumoniae Bloodstream infections (first infection per patient per year) 75 Bloodstream infections 59 (34–84) In range
3GC-resistant E coli Inpatient blood and urine (first infection per patient per year) 2953 All infection types; inpatients only 2034 (1108–2960) Probable 
underestimate
3GC-resistant K pneumoniae Inpatient blood and urine (first infection per patient per year) 520 All infection types; inpatients only 347 (198–496) Underestimate
Carbapenem-resistant E coli Bloodstream infections 3 Bloodstream infections 1 (0–1) Underestimate
Carbapenem-resistant K pneumoniae Bloodstream infections 4 Bloodstream infections 3 (2–5) In range
Sweden3,21
3GC-resistant E coli All infection types; inpatients and outpatients; includes 
about 28% screening cultures†
8161 All infection types; inpatients and 
outpatients
13 417 
(7307–19 526)
Overestimate
3GC-resistant K pneumoniae All infection types; inpatients and outpatients; includes about 
28% screening cultures†
668 All infection types; inpatients and 
outpatients
1166 (666–1666) Overestimate
ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae Bloodstream infections 520 Bloodstream infections; E coli and 
K pneumoniae only
396 (212–560) Probably in range
Carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae
All infection types 19 All infection types; E coli and 
K pneumoniae only
32 (19–46) Probably in range
Norway3,22
3GC-resistant E coli Bloodstream infections (6 months only) 95 Bloodstream infections (12 months) 174 (95–253) Probably in range
3GC-resistant K pneumoniae Bloodstream infections (9 months only) 26 Bloodstream infections (12 months) 43 (24–61) Probably in range
Carbapenem-resistant E coli All infection types 4 All infection types 7 (4–10) In range
Carbapenem-resistant K pneumoniae All infection types 6 All infection types 5 (3–7) In range
Israel‡
3GC-resistant E coli Bloodstream infections 1526 Bloodstream infections 1757 (957–2558) In range
3GC-resistant K pneumoniae Bloodstream infections 1213 Bloodstream infections 1033 (590–1476) In range
Carbapenem-resistant E coli Bloodstream infections 11 Bloodstream infections 14 (8–20) In range
Carbapenem-resistant K pneumoniae Bloodstream infections 113 Bloodstream infections 61 (34–88) Underestimate
New York, USA23,24
Carbapenem-resistant E coli All infection types 249 All infection types 386 (226–546) In range
Carbapenem-resistant K pneumoniae All infection types 2470 All infection types 2941 (1634–4248) In range
Carbapenem-resistant E coli and 
K pneumoniae
Bloodstream infections 372 Bloodstream infections 546 (305–788) In range
Maryland, USA25§
Carbapenem-resistant E coli All infection types 69 All infection types 0 Underestimate
Carbapenem-resistant K pneumoniae All infection types 242 All infection types 166 (92–240) Underestimate
Carbapenem-resistant E coli Bloodstream infections (first infection per patient per year) 2 Bloodstream infections 0 Underestimate
Carbapenem-resistant K pneumoniae Bloodstream infections (first infection per patient per year) 14 Bloodstream infections 
(first infection per patient per year)
28 (16–41) Overestimate
3GC=third-generation cephalosporin. ESBL=extended-spectrum β-lactamase. *Data in parentheses are interval estimates derived from changing the fixed incidence of susceptible infections to 1 SD below and 
above the weighted mean.†Screening cultures detect colonisation, not infection. ‡Data for Israel were obtained from the National Center for Infection Control, Israel, and are unpublished. §The observed data 
came from personal communication with David Blythe and Elisabeth Vaeth at Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.
Table 3: Comparison of estimated number of infections and number observed by surveillance systems based on mandatory reporting
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by third-generation cephalosporin-resistant K pneumoniae 
in Israel (1213) fell within the ranges estimated by the 
additive (1033 [interval estimate 590–1476]) and 25% 
(946 [541–1351]) and 50% (860 [491–1226]) replacement 
models; the estimate from the 75% replacement model 
was lower than the observed value (773 [442–1101]).
Discussion
In 2014, the O’Neill report estimated that 700 000 deaths per 
year are attributable to antimicrobial-resistant infections 
(including malaria, HIV, and tuberculosis).26 Although 
estimation of the number of resistant infections was a step 
in this calculation, those methods and results were not 
published.26,27 We aimed to estimate the global number of 
infections caused by third-generation cephalosporin-
resistant and carbapenem-resistant E coli and K pneumoniae, 
and to provide an explicit assessment of the assumptions 
and the quality of data on which the estimates were based.
The first report to present a multicountry estimate of 
the incidence of antibiotic-resistant infections was The 
Bacterial Challenge: Time to React, issued by the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC) in 2009.28 Using data from EARS-Net, the report 
estimated the number of inpatient infections caused 
by resistant organisms in 29 European countries in 
2007, including 32 500 by third-generation cephalosporin-
resistant E coli and 18 900 by third-generation cephalo-
sporin-resistant K pneumoniae. The methods differed 
from ours in that the ECDC calculated the number of 
resistant bloodstream infections in each country using 
the number of resistant isolates submitted to EARS-Net 
and the proportion of the country that was covered by 
surveillance. By contrast, we defined a constant mean 
incidence of susceptible infections that enabled 
generation of estimates for all countries, based solely on 
the level of resistance.
On a national scale, in 2013, the US CDC issued 
estimates of the number of hospital-acquired infections 
caused by antibiotic-resistant bacteria based on data from a 
point-prevalence study done in acute-care hospitals in ten 
US states.29 The US CDC’s estimates were lower than the 
estimates in this study—for example, the US CDC 
estimated that 9300 hospital-acquired infections were 
caused by carbapenem-resistant E coli and K pneumoniae, 
whereas we estimated that 33 994 (interval estimate 19 163–
48 824) inpatient infections were caused by these 
microorganisms. In New York, USA, half of all infections 
caused by carbapenem-resistant E coli and K pneumoniae 
in 2014 were hospital acquired.23 If the same is true 
throughout the USA, then our point estimate of no-
socomial carbapenem-resistant infections (16 997) is 
almost twice as high as the US CDC’s. Another study30 
based on data from electronic medical records from 192 US 
hospitals reported an estimate for carbapenem-resistant 
E coli and K pneumoniae that was slightly higher than our 
point estimate but within our range: 42 852 infections in 
the USA in 2014. The difference might be due to their 
inclusion of all species of carbapenem-resistant Entero-
bacteriaceae. Colomb-Cotinat and coll eagues31 estimated 
the number of inpatient infections caused by multidrug-
resistant bacteria in France in 2012, and reported estimates 
for infections caused by third-generation cephalosporin-
resistant K pneumoniae (16 314 infec tions) and carbapenem-
resistant K pneumoniae (602 infections) that overlap 
with ours (estimates for France from this study are in 
appendix 2). By contrast, our estimate for infections caused 
by third-generation cephalosporin-resistant E coli was 
slightly lower than Colomb-Cotinat and colleagues’ 
estimate (50 916 infections).
We recognise the many potential sources of bias or 
uncertainty in our estimations. First, use of a single 
incidence of serious infections caused by susceptible 
E coli and K pneumoniae for all countries might have 
been an oversimplification. Although the funnel plots 
supported our hypothesis of a uniform incidence, data 
were available only from high-income and upper-middle-
income countries. We confirmed that estimates based on 
this fixed incidence were generally accurate for sites with 
incidence data from mandatory reporting, but no such 
comparisons were available for low-income or lower-
middle-income countries. The incidence of susceptible 
infections in these countries might be higher (eg, because 
of poorer sanitation) or lower (eg, because of differences 
in population age structure) than our fixed incidence.
Second, we based the calculation of the incidence of 
serious susceptible infections in each country on the 
number of isolates submitted for surveillance by 
17 countries. This number is subject to ascertainment 
bias stemming from differences in countries’ practices 
regarding the frequency of taking blood cultures. Indeed, 
when we used EARS-Net data32 to estimate the number of 
blood-culture sets processed in participating laboratories 
per 1000 population covered by surveillance, the ratio 
was two times lower for Latvia and Hungary (which were 
consistently near the bottom of our funnel plots) than for 
other countries. Notably, most countries with a high 
surveillance coverage are wealthy countries where we 
would expect high ascertainment of infections. The 
incidence of serious susceptible infections in these 
countries was often higher than the mean, suggesting 
that the mean incidence of susceptible infections in our 
study (and thus the calculated number of resistant 
infections) might be an underestimate.
Third, there were potential sources of bias regarding 
our estimates for each country. Grade 1–2 quality data on 
levels of resistance were available for only 31% (for 
carbapenem-resistant E coli) to 43% (for third-generation 
cephalosporin-resistant E coli) of countries. We imputed 
resistance levels for 31–41% of countries. Additionally, 
samples might not have been representative of the 
whole country because resistance can vary by region, 
and tertiary care hospitals, which are the source 
of most academic reports, might have higher levels of 
resistance than would community hospitals (although a 
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US study33 found no such difference). The possibility of 
sampling bias is particularly relevant to India, whose 
resistance estimates (82% in the case of third-generation 
cephalosporin-resistant E coli) were obtained from small 
samples of isolates. Because India comprises 18% of the 
world’s population, overestimation of resistance in India 
would substantially inflate the world totals; for this 
reason, we distinguished between higher-certainty, 
moderate-certainty, and low-certainty regions when 
presenting global estimates. Moreover, some data on 
resistance levels were collected before 2014, which might 
have led to underestimation of the number of resistant 
infections in countries where levels of resistance are 
rapidly increasing. Furthermore, anatomical sources of 
isolates varied, although the bias that this variation 
introduces might be minor given that antimicrobial 
resistance monitors in Sweden reported that resistance 
among E coli isolates from outpatient urine and inpatient 
blood cultures was quite similar.34
Finally, we note that our 25%, 50%, and 75% replacement 
models are, indeed, models. No empirical evidence exists 
to validate which, if any, of these models approximates 
resistance dynamics in countries where resistance levels 
are high. High resistance in the most populated countries, 
particularly China (for third-generation cephalosporin-
resistant E coli) and India (for all but carbapenem-resistant 
E coli), drives the wide variation in our global estimates. 
Although we acknowledge these limitations, we believe 
that we have generated the best possible estimates with 
the available data.
In their article, de Kraker and colleagues27 were critical 
of the methods used to estimate antimicrobial-resistant 
infections in the O’Neill and ECDC reports.26,28 Some of 
these weaknesses, such as the use of data that might not 
be representative or possible error in estimating 
infections in all anatomical sites from surveillance based 
on blood cultures, might also apply to our study. 
However, we have overcome other limitations cited by 
de Kraker and colleagues. First, O’Neill26 estimated the 
number of resistant infections in countries not in EARS-
Net by applying the EARS-Net mean incidence, whereas 
we searched other sources to identify country-specific 
estimates of resistance. For highly populated countries 
such as China, Russia, and Brazil, we cited grade 1 data 
sources that reported resistance levels higher than those 
in most EARS-Net countries, suggesting that O’Neill’s 
methods produced underestimates. Second, de Kraker 
and colleagues observed that the reports by the ECDC 
and O’Neill did not clearly state the uncertainties 
inherent in each step of their calculations. We have 
stated uncertainties and potential sources of bias, and 
have supplied our calculations for scrutiny and revision.
Our approach of using a uniform incidence of serious 
susceptible infections to estimate the number of resistant 
infections is probably not suitable for other resistant 
pathogens such as carbapenem-resistant Acinetobacter 
and Pseudomonas and vancomycin-resistant enterococci; 
the incidence of infections caused by the susceptible 
form of these pathogens differs substantially between 
locations.35,36 To generate estimates of the incidence and 
number of infections caused by these organisms, and to 
improve our estimates for E coli and K pneumoniae, 
surveillance systems must gather both numerator data 
on the number of resistant infections per time period 
and population-level denominator data. Two new WHO 
initiatives to strengthen and standardise antimicrobial 
resistance sur veillance worldwide, the Global Anti mi-
crobial Resistance Surveillance System37 and ESBL Ec 
Tricycle,38 might help to provide the necessary additional 
data. Improving the accuracy of global estimates of 
the number of antibiotic-resistant infections will enhance 
efforts to prioritise infection prevention activities, limit 
the spread of anti biotic resistance, and develop new 
antibiotics.
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